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Abstract.
It has been argued that quantum mechanics forces us to accept the existence
of metaphysical, mind-independent indeterminacy. In this paper we provide
an interpretation of the indeterminacy involved in the quantum phenomena
in terms of a view that we call Plural Metaphysical Supervaluationism.
According to it, quantum indeterminacy is captured in terms of an
irreducibly plural relation between the actual world and various
misrepresentations of it.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature in philosophy discussing whether and how we
can make sense of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI for short) or, as the
received view has it, whether all indeterminacy is semantic. A question1
which has taken central stage in this discussion is whether quantum
mechanics entails the existence of MI. This issue is particularly important,
since if it does, this appears to give us broadly naturalistic reasons to
abandon the received view and accept the existence of MI.
In this paper we develop a new view of MI, which we call Plural
Metaphysical Supervaluationism. In §2 we discuss quantum mechanical
1 The debate originates with Evans 1978. See e.g. Akiba & Abasnezhad 2014. See
also Rosen & Smith 2004 and Barnes 2010. The received view is well exemplified
by Lewis’s claim that “[t]he only intelligible account of vagueness locates it in our
thought and language” (1986, p. 212).
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indeterminacy. In §3 we introduce the core ideas of metaphysical
supervaluationism, an account of MI due to Barnes & Williams. §4 is
dedicated to the development of our own account, which departs from
metaphysical supervaluationism in several ways. In §5, we argue that plural
metaphysical supervaluationism accommodates the quantum case better
than its rivals.
2 Quantum Indeterminacy
Quantum indeterminacy (QI) emerges from the peculiar structure of
property attribution to microscopic systems such as subatomic particles. It is
well known that certain pairs of properties, the so-called incompatible ones,
cannot jointly be assigned definite values. For instance, if we were to
measure the observable position, the mathematical structure of the theory
would prohibit the assignment of a definite value for momentum to the same
system at the same time. This is because position and momentum are
incompatible observables. Since the very birth of the theory, this peculiar
feature of the microscopic world, which we shall call Lack of Value
Definiteness (LVD for short), was taken to suggest that the world itself, not
our representations of it, might sometimes lack determination.2
To understand what LVD consists of, let us consider a simple example
from quantum mechanics (QM). Take the property known as spin. Roughly,
a way to visualize it is by thinking of classical angular momentum. If
microscopic particles were billiard balls, their spin would be the direction
along which they rotate on a certain axis. Unlike classical angular
momentum, spin is a quantized quantity, which means it is discrete. Thus,
for each given axis, electrons (which are fermions, and so have spin-1⁄2) can
only take two possible values, which we call up and down. It is an empirical
fact that spin components in three mutually orthogonal directions (call them
x y and z) are incompatible observables. That is, if we know, say, that the
electron e has spinDOWN on the x-axis (suppose we have measured it), we
also know that its spin on the other two axis cannot be definitely assigned.
We could use bra-ket notation to write the quantum states of the electron as
follows:
2 Heisenberg has often suggested a similar view (see the collection of papers from
2007). Schrödinger (1935) considers this option (the fifth section of the
‘cat-experiment’ paper is entitled ‘Are the variables really blurred?’), but
eventually rejects it.
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(1) e = |↓x >
(2) e = |↓x > = 1/√2 |↓z > + 1/√2 |↑z >
(3) e = |↓x > = 1/√2 |↓y > + 1/√2 |↑y >
(1) expresses the fact that the electron is in an eigenstate of having the value
‘down’ for the observable x-spin, while (2)-(3) express superposition states
of the observables that are incompatible with x-spin, namely z-spin and
y-spin. One major interpretative issue in quantum mechanics is related to
what we should say about states of superposition like the above. If a system
is in superposition of a certain observable, this seems to suggest that it does
not possess a definite value (it is neither ‘this’ nor ‘that’, although ‘being
this’ and ‘being that’ exhaust the possibilities). How are we supposed to
make sense of this?
The first, quite natural reaction is to stress that everything we just said
merely indicates our epistemic limitations—we just happen not to know
which value is possessed by the system, yet it does always possess one.
However, many foundational results in quantum theory, most crucially the
Kochen-Specker theorem (1967), have shown that supplementing the theory
with hidden variables (roughly: the values we have no access to) will not be
possible in some cases. Superposition states need to be taken seriously from
a metaphysical perspective, and positing metaphysical indeterminacy is one
way of doing so.
Let us get back to LVD. Since to every eigenstate there are some
corresponding superposition states, and since being in an eigenstate simply
means possessing a definite-valued property, LVD in quantum mechanics is
pervasive. To make a generalized statement, we need to look at how in QM
physical properties are attributed to systems, a task that is performed by the
so-called Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link (EEL):
EEL. A quantum system s has a definite value v for the observable O iff
it is in an eigenstate of O having eigenvalue v.
From EEL, we can straightforwardly derive that systems that are not in an
eigenstate of having value v for the corresponding properties, do not possess
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a definite value for those properties. And since, as we said earlier, to each
eigenstate there always correspond certains superposition states, QM along
with EEL describe a world in which properties are often instantiated
indefinitely. This is, in a nutshell, LVD in quantum mechanics.
EEL is at the core of the standard interpretation of the theory, sometimes
called Orthodox or Copenhagen QM. In the discussion about QI it is
common to assume EEL as a good starting point, so as to give what Wallace
calls an “interpretation-neutral discussion of the ontology of QM” (2016).
By referring to EEL, for instance, Calosi & Wilson (2019) distinguish three
sources of QI: incompatible observables, superposition, entanglement. Each
of these phenomena, once coupled with the EEL, will entail that the relevant
systems lack value definitedness.
So the story goes for Orthodox QM. However, as it is well known, this
approach is not the only way to interpret QM, and more importantly, due to
the measurement problem it is not even a viable one according to numerous
commentators (e.g. Maudlin 1995). Furthermore, Orthodox QM cannot be
straightforwardly taken as realist with respect to the quantum state; but then,
why should we take metaphysical lessons from a theory that cannot be taken
at aiming at describing reality? In effect, in the recent debate on quantum
indeterminacy there has been a substantial shift from a discussion of LVD in
Orthodox QM (Skow 2010, Darby 2010, Bokulich 2014) towards a
discussion within realist interpretations of the theory (Glick 2017, Calosi &
Wilson 2019, Calosi & Mariani 2020; for an overview of the debate, see
Calosi & Mariani 2021)—where by realist we mean a certain attitude
towards either the quantum state (see Miller 2014) or the observables
(Rovelli 1996).
According to the major realist interpretations, the EEL is not the correct
way to ascribe properties on the ground of the quantum state, so what
happens to LVD? Glick (2017) and Chen (2020) both argue that once a
precise underlying ontology is given to QM, any indeterminacy disappears.
Here is Glick (2017):
If […] one took the properties to be ontologically derivative and quantum states
to be fundamental, there would be little room for metaphysical indeterminacy
[…] any indeterminacy would occur at the non-fundamental level and hence
may be viewed as eliminable. (p. 206, italics added)
Similarly Chen (2020):
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[...] we now have realist theories of quantum mechanics such as Bohm’s theory,
GRW collapse theory, and Everett’s theory that make quantum mechanics
precise. In those precise theories, ontic vagueness disappears: there is no
indeterminacy in the fundamental ontology or fundamental dynamics. (12,
italics added)
Even granting that there is no fundamental indeterminacy in the major
approaches to QM, we should wonder whether Chen and Glick have
successfully established that eliminativism is the right position to
adopt—that is, whether we should understand all indeterminacy in
non-metaphysical (either semantic or epistemic) terms. Another hypothesis
is that the indeterminacy is still metaphysical, although derivative. After all,
why expect that non-fundamental indeterminacy be necessarily semantic or
epistemic? Indeed, Glick himself seems to maintain that indeterminacy
affects the derivative ontology (see quote above).
Thus, LVD arguably affects the ontology of many realist approaches to
QM—at least at some derivative level—as well as the fundamental ontology
of Orthodox QM (granting that we could make sense of it) . This strongly3
suggests that quantum indeterminacy has to be taken seriously, and that a
clear metaphysical picture explaining this phenomenon has to be developed.
Supervaluationism is sometimes called the standard theory of vagueness
(Varzi 2007, p. 633) and it arguably can also lay claim to this title in the
literature on metaphysical indeterminacy. Metaphysical versions of the
theory have been developed and defended by Akiba (see Akiba 2000a,
2004) and by Barnes and Williams in a series of papers (2011 contains the
most mature version). However, it has been argued that the metaphysical
version of supervaluationism is unable to account for QI (Darby 2010, Skow
2010, Calosi & Wilson 2019). In the next section, we discuss metaphysical
supervaluationism. In the rest of the paper we develop our theory, Plural
Metaphysical Supervaluationism, discuss Metaphysical Supervaluationism’s
difficult relationship with quantum mechanics and argue that—unlike
Metaphysical Supervaluationism—our theory can successfully capture QI.
3 Metaphysical Supervaluationism
3 Bokulich (2014, p. 460), for instance, is explicit that an understanding of QI
might provide good grounds for interpreting orthodox QM in a realist fashion.
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The fundamental idea of metaphysical supervaluationism is that MI can be
modeled as indeterminacy with respect to which metaphysical
precisifications of the actual world within a range of admissible ones
correctly represents it. In this section, we will first introduce how the idea is
developed by Barnes and Williams, and then give a rationale for why one4
should adopt a supervaluationist theory instead of one of the rival theories
of MI which have been proposed in the literature.
3.1 The Core Ideas of Barnes & Williams’ Version of Supervaluationism
Barnes and Williams’ (B&W) theory is modeled on the supervaluationist
theory of vagueness. Semantic vagueness is a particular sort of linguistic
indeterminacy which affects predicates and it is generally associated with
the Sorites paradox. A characteristic feature of vague predicates is that they
do not allow us to draw a sharp line between objects to which they
definitely apply and objects to which they definitely fail to apply. Consider
for example a language L that contains a predicate such as ‘bald’. There are
some people to which the predicate definitely applies (think of a person with
absolutely no hairs on their head) and others to which it definitely fails to
apply (think of a person with a full head of hair). But then there are also
some people who are neither definitely bald, nor definitely not bald (think of
someone who is in the process of balding, but still has a significant amount
of hair).5
Supervaluationism appeals to variations of the language L (or variations
of its interpretation, depending on the details of the account), in which it
introduces a sharp delineation between the bald and the non-bald by fiat. If
we do this for each vague predicate of a language, the result will be a
precisification of L—a complete classical variant (or interpretation) of L. In
its semantic understanding, supervaluationism is based on the idea that
languages containing vague predicates always admit a multitude of
admissible precisifications—the ones that are not ruled out by established
conventions governing the meaning of the expressions of the language. The
5 This feature of vague predicates renders them susceptible to the sorites paradox,
to which supervaluationism offers a solution. See Fine 1975, Keefe 2000, §7-8 for
influential defenses of the theory.
4 See in particular Barnes 2010, Barnes and Williams 2011, Barnes 2013, Williams
2008. We take the version developed in Barnes and Williams 2011 to be the
definite version of their theory.
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core idea of semantic supervaluationism is thus that vagueness can be
understood as unsettledness regarding which of these admissible
precisifications gives us (the correct interpretation of) the language.
Metaphysical Supervaluationism (MS) is an attempt to give a
metaphysical construal of this idea. While in the case of semantic
indeterminacy the precisification are variations of the language (or its
interpretation) that contains vague expressions, in the case of MI, the
precisifications are taken to be variations of the actual world. Unsettledness,
thus, does not concern the semantic facts that govern the (vague)
expressions; rather, it is unsettled which presification corresponds to the
actual world.
Let us unpack this claim. The three concepts which need explaining here
are that of unsettledness, that of a precisification of the actual world, and
that of correspondence between precisifications and the actual world.
We will follow the approach to unsettledness taken in B&W (2011);
according to them, the notion expressed by “unsettled” in our schematic
statement of the idea should be replaced by a pre-theoretical notion of
indefiniteness which is not further analysable (2011, 108ff.). This means
that the account of MI on offer in both B&W’s variant of MS and in ours is
non-reductive in the sense that it relies on a primitive notion of
indeterminacy, which cannot be explained in terms of other elements of
more fundamental ontology.
We will also follow B&W in identifying precisifications of the actual
world with ersatz possible worlds which stand in a particular relation to it,
such that they qualify as representations of it (2011, 114.) In contrast to the
possible worlds posited by modal realism which are exactly the same sort of
maximally connected (analogous) spatiotemporal wholes as the actual world
(cf. Lewis 1986), ersatz worlds are abstract entities. For the purposes of
illustration it might help to think of them as maximally consistent sets of
propositions, but we can remain neutral regarding questions of what sort of
entities ersatz worlds are, as long as they are fit to play their theoretical role.
Following usage, if an ersatz world w contains a proposition p, we will say
that p is true in w—that is, p is true in a given possible (ersatz) world, or in
a given precisification.
What does it take for an ersatz world to be a precisification of the actual
world? B&W’s idea is that the precisifications of the actual world are those
ersatz worlds which do not determinately misrepresent reality, i.e. the actual
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world (2011, 115). Note that ersatz worlds are meant to be complete
representations of our universe, regardless of whether they are correct or
incorrect ones. This will become important later on, when we will
complicate our picture of the representational role of ersatz worlds in our
theory.
This leaves the third notion, that of correspondence between the actual
world and an ersatz world. Since unlike the actual world, ersatz worlds are
abstract entities, correspondence can here not simply mean identity.
However, leaving MI aside, one of the ersatz worlds can be actualized,
which means that it is the one ersatz world which correctly represents the
actual facts.
Putting these notions back together, we get the following core claim of
B&W theory:
B&W. It is metaphysically indeterminate whether p if, and only if, there
is an ersatz world w which is a precisification of the actual world in
which p is true and an ersatz world w’ which is a precisification of the
actual world in which ~p is true and it is indefinite which of w and w’ is
the actualized ersatz world.
3.2 Alternatives to and a Rationale for MS
B&W’s theory is not the only theory of metaphysical indeterminacy on the
market. Its three main rivals are: (i) the fuzzy logic-based theory developed
in Rosen & Smith (2004), which is based on an ontology of fuzzy
properties; (ii) Wilson’s determinable-based theory (2013, Calosi & Wilson
2019), according to which metaphysical indeterminacy is to be understood
in terms of states of affairs which are indeterminate in virtue of containing
an object which has a determinable property, but either lacks or has multiple
determinates of this determinable property at the same level of
determination; and (iii) Akiba’s (2000a, 2004) variant of MS, which is based
on the idea that the world has, besides spatial and (perhaps) temporal and
modal dimensions, also a precisificational dimension throughout which
material objects extend.
There are two reasons which a priori speak for B&W’s theory. First, the
fact that it builds on a supervaluationst framework means that it is in line
with a potential unified explanation of a range of different kinds of
indeterminacy in terms of the same underlying formal structure—including
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predicate vagueness (see Fine 1975, Keefe 2000), indeterminacy in
mathematics (see Akiba 2000b, Field 1994), empty names treated as lacking
determinate reference (van Fraassen 1966), vague identity statements (Varzi
2020), and the open future (Thomason 1970, Barnes & Cameron 2008). A
second reason is that B&W’s theory is metaphysically less committal than
both Rosen & Smith’s theory, which posits fuzzy properties, and Wilson’s,
which requires both the existence of states of affairs and the brute,
unexplained distinction between determinable and determinate properties.
This second reason also speaks against Akiba’s version of MS, since
Akiba’s reliance on a precisificational dimension is metaphysically more
revisionary than B&W’s reliance on a machinery of ersatz worlds.
We take those to be good reasons to exploit MS to account for MI.
However, B&W’s version of the view has certain drawbacks which we
tackle in §5, after developing our view.
4 Plural Metaphysical Supervaluationism
4.1 The Core Idea of PMS
The main point of this section is to introduce a novel version of MS, which
we call Plural Metaphysical Supervaluationism (PMS). The core difference
between our version of MS and that of Barnes and Williams is that it takes
the relation which holds between reality (the actual world, our universe, as
opposed to the abstract ersatz worlds) and those ersatz worlds which qualify
as precisifications of reality in a model to be a plural relation. B&W take
this relation, call it Rp, to be a singular relation which holds between reality
and one ersatz world. Our proposal is to replace this singular relation by a
relation which relates reality to a plurality of worlds. This means that while
in B&W’s theory only single ersatz world can be precisifications, in ours it
will usually be pluralities of ersatz words which constitute precisifications
of the actual world.6
Importantly, we claim that the plurality of these worlds is irreducibly
plural in at least some cases of MI. As we will discuss in detail in § 5, these
cases in particular include cases of MI which arise from quantum
6 Note that we will later qualify the notion of precisification by distinguishing
between the relations of admissibility, which holds between a possible universe and
a model, and of co-precisification, which holds between ersatz worlds in a model
and which corresponds to the accessibility relation in standard modal logic. See §
4.2.1.
9
mechanics, i.e. cases of QI. In this section, we focus on developing the core
idea of our theory in a general manner.
Irreducibly plural instantiations of properties are properties which are
instantiated by a plurality of objects xx, but neither by any of the single7
objects among the xx, nor by any sub-plurality of the xx, i.e. any plurality
consisting of some objects among the xx, but not of all of them. There is in
general nothing unusual about such cases. Think for example of the
relational property of holding hands to form a human chain around the base
of the Empire State Building. We can imagine a group of protesters which
forms a very tight chain around the building, so that if any of them were to
leave, the remaining protesters could not hold hands to close the chain
again. We claim that the relation of being a precisification of reality, Rpp, as8
applied to a plurality of ersatz worlds in particular cases of MI is of this
kind: in such cases, each of the worlds contributes to precisifying reality, but
none of them alone counts as a precisification of reality, and neither do just
some, but not all of them.
So consider a case in which reality is metaphysically indeterminate
regarding whether p is the case. In this case, there are two ersatz worlds
which correctly represent all the actual precise facts, but disagree regarding
p. One of the two will represent reality as being such that p, the other as
being such that ~p. According to our view there are particular cases of MI of
this sort in which, metaphorically speaking, both of them have to work
together to count as precisifications of reality and none of the two alone
does. This is the basic idea of PMS.
Our reliance on genuinely plural instances of a relation might appear
problematic in cases in which there is no MI in reality. Similarly to semantic
supervaluationism, PMS will model these cases as involving only a single
ersatz world which does not definitely misrepresent reality rather than a
plurality of ersatz worlds which do. This might seem to pose a problem,
given that Rpp is a plural relation which holds between reality and a plurality
of ersatz-worlds. But this problem is only apparent. It is standard in plural
logic to accept single objects as limiting cases of pluralities. Accordingly,9
9 See Oliver & Smiley 2016, p. 212.
8 Contrast this to a case in which the protesters form a less tight chain, so that one
or two of them could leave without breaking it.
7 We use double lowercase letters to indicate that a constant or variable is plural, as
is standard in plural logic. See e.g. Oliver & Smiley 2016.
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in a case where there is no MI, our theory will account for this in terms of
there being a model containing a single world which does not definitely
misrepresent reality. Similarly, our theory can fully accommodate cases of
MI in which some or even each precisifications counts as a precisification of
reality on its own. In such cases, the plurality is still a plurality, just not an
irreducible one.
The move to the plural precisification-relation Rpp has several10
consequences for the overall theory. One consequence concerns the intuitive
interpretation of what it means to count as a precisification, as already
hinted at. Barnes and Williams characterize their relation Rp as holding
between reality and an ersatz world which “does not determinately
misrepresent reality” (2011, 115). One might adapt this characterization to
the plural relation Rpp by simply describing it as the relation which holds
between reality and a plurality of ersatz worlds which only taken together as
a complete plurality are such that they do not determinately misrepresent
reality. The idea would be that in cases of MI which require an irreducibly
plural notion of precisification, a single ersatz world on its own always
determinately misrepresents reality. To foreshadow the detailed discussion
of QI of §5, in cases of QI, single ersatz-worlds assign precise values to
properties where physics tells us that no definite value is had, and as a
result, no single ersatz world can on its own count as an admissible
precisification of reality. If we rely on a plurality of worlds instead to model
QI, the same problem does not arise, since taken together, these worlds will
not assign a definite value to the relevant property. The plurality gives us a
range of different values which the property may take, of which we can
single out none as the one correct value assigned to the property. So what
the worlds together manage to do is to indicate exactly the respect in which
reality is indeterminate. In the QI case, this means that there is a property
(observable) to which no definite value is assigned. What they do not do is
to represent reality as being such that the relevant observable has a
particular value, or more generally speaking, as being such that the
indeterminate portion of reality is as any single one among them tells us.
This is one option, but there is another, which we will rely on in what
follows. We might instead characterize the relation as that of holding
between reality and a plurality of ersatz worlds which only taken together as
10 Note that we will discuss the aptness of this label for Rpp in light of its role with
respect to the model theory in §3.2.1.
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a complete plurality are such that they do give us a precise representation of
the indeterminacy of reality. While the first interpretation gives us, to use a
term used by Calosi & Wilson (2019), a gappy view of MI, since the worlds
in the precisification collectively fail to determinately misrepresent reality,
the second characterization gives us a glutty view of MI, since the plurality
of worlds specify a local glut of logically possible states of affairs, none11 12
of which obtains. This glut of states of affairs provides a precise model of13
the complete state of our universe, including in particular the aspect, or
aspects, with respect to which it is indeterminate.
The resulting model is precise in two ways. First, it precisely locates the
indeterminacy in a particular (set of) states of affairs. Second, it also
indicates precisely which variations of this state of affairs could possibly
obtain. In the context of QI, the relation might hence give us a model which
locates the indeterminacy in a particular observable, e.g. an electron’s spin
along a given axis, and it furthermore delineates all the possible values it
could take, e.g. spinUP and spinDOWN on the given axis.
Before we dive deeper into the details of the theory, let us pause to
provide a more intuitive illustration of what the glutty version of PMS does.
Its core idea is that in a case of metaphysical indeterminacy regarding p, a
glut of ersatz possible worlds which diverge regarding whether p is or is not
true manage to precisely characterize the indeterminate state of the world
regarding p. How can that work? Taking a step back, we can see that the key
to answering this question is to provide an explanation of how a range of
conflicting alternatives bundled together manage to paint a complete and
precise picture of a complex situation involving indeterminacy regarding a
particular aspect of the situation. Taking this observation as its starting
point, our illustration takes the form of an analogy.14
14 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helping us clarify the analogy and
the following explanation.
13 As we will see, in the case of the QI, none of those logically possible states of
affairs can nomologically obtain.
12 Note that “state of affairs” is here used for illustrative purposes only and is not
meant to indicate that our theory presupposes an ontology of states of affairs.
11 The notion of possibility here and in the remainder of the paragraph must be
wider than physical/nomic possibility in the sense that it allows for completely
precise ersatz worlds to count as possible precisifications of reality. Logical
possibility fits this bill, but so might metaphysical possibility.
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Imagine a population of ice cream lovers, a group of people who not only
have a general taste for ice cream, but also share a curious trait: for each ice
cream flavour available to them, any member of the group has a determinate
disposition to either like, or not like it. If you would offer them a sample of
any one of these flavours and ask them whether they liked it, all members of
the group would be able to immediately answer either with a clear `yes’ or
`no’. As it turns out, the preferences of the group are surprisingly
homogeneous. Regarding the flavours available to them, all members of the
group agree on whether they like it or dislike it. They do so, because for
every such flavour they share the same disposition which either compels
them to like, or to not like it. Now imagine that an artisanal ice cream
producer develops a new ice cream flavour called “mangrue”. A peculiar
thing about mangrue ice cream is that our ice cream lovers do not have the
same kind of disposition for mangrue flavoured ice cream which they have
for all the other flavours. Tasting mangrue ice cream leaves them puzzled
and unable to say whether they like it or not.
Now imagine that you are tasked by the Society for the Appreciation of
Group Preferences™ to find out which ice cream flavours the group as a
whole likes and dislikes. Being new to the job, the only thing you know is
that ice cream is immensely popular in this particular group and that you
have a tight deadline to submit the results. Along with a lot of ice cream
samples, you are equipped with a data entry terminal and a rather basic
polling software. For each ice cream lover, the software records a data set
associating each ice cream flavour with a single binary value whose two
possible values stand for “like” and “dislike” respectively. The software
expects a complete data-set for each person, so in order to enter the data at
all, the participants have to answer with either “like” or “dislike” regarding
any flavour. There is no option for anyone to either refrain from answering,
or to enter two values for an item.
Having no disposition to either like or dislike mangrue, the participants
in the study ask you what to do if they neither definitely like, nor definitely
dislike a flavour. Knowing the software and its rather crude limitations, you
tell them to just randomly enter “like” or “dislike” and reassure them that
you will make a note of this particular item and take care of the garbage data
when analyzing the results. After completing the tasting and polling stage of
the study, you proceed to inspect your collected data and notice the, to you,
rather surprising agreement regarding all the other ice cream flavours, as
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well as the random fluctuation between “like” and “dislike” regarding
mangrue among members of the group. After a minute of disgruntled
silence, it dawns on you: What you thought to be garbage data actually
provides you with an accurate model of the group’s preferences!
The data sets for each individual participant are complete and contain a
determinate value for every ice cream flavour. Each one considered on its
own hence misrepresents the group’s preference, since it gives one
determinate answer, namely about whether mangrue is liked, where no such
answer should be given. But this does not mean that these data sets cannot
be used to accurately represent the group’s preference. It turns out that you
just need to carefully distinguish between complete and partial, correct and
incorrect, as well als the individual’s and the group’s representations of
preferred ice cream flavours. Since the individual data sets all agree
regarding the value for all flavours except mangrue, each partially manges
to correctly represent the group’s overall likes and dislikes. With respect to
these flavours, the group’s likes and dislikes are simply identical to those of
the individuals. But each individual data set also fails to correctly represent
the group’s complete preference, since it contains a value for mangrue
which does not reflect the group’s preference or distaste. But what is the
group’s preference or distaste regarding mangrue? It seems the right thing to
say is that it is indeterminate. It turns out that there is a way of correctly
representing this aspect of the the group’s preference by relying only on the
mostly, i.e. partially correct, but partially incorrect individual data sets: the
fact that the group as a whole does not agree on whether they like or dislike
mangrue already tells us that the group’s complete preference-profile for ice
cream flavours is indeterminate with respect to one of its aspects, namely
the group’s like or dislike of mangrue flavoured ice cream. This means that
you can have a representation of the preferences of the group that is both
complete and correct. The only unusual thing is that your indicator for
indeterminacy is not a lack of recorded values, but rather a surplus. Since
the ice cream lovers are a large group and the set-up of the poll allowed no
coordination between them, all the values are present. But as we have seen,
we can just interpret this glut of values as pointing us to an indeterminate
aspect of the small piece of reality which you were supposed to capture in
your experiment. Your job is done. You can finally call it a day and enjoy a
fine scoop of mangrue ice cream!
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In light of the analogy let us return to PMS to see how the theory models
MI and QI. Importantly, the theory does not provide a reductive definition,
but rather provides a framework which allows us to model indeterminacy.
Assume that our universe is indeterminate with respect to whether p is the
case, but otherwise determinate. PMS allows us to construct an intended
model of this scenario by first sorting the totality of the ersatz worlds into
those which incorrectly represent all determinate aspects of reality (i.e.
everything except what’s captured by p) and those which correctly represent
them and only admitting the worlds in the latter category into our model.
This is the job of the plural precisification-relation Rpp. Like the data sets
constrained by the limitation of the polling software in our analogy, each
ersatz world in the model individually gives us a definite answer concerning
whether any proposition about our universe is true or false and therefore
individually give us a complete, but on the whole incorrect representation of
our universe, since they misrepresent it with respect to p (and only with
respect to p!). This is not a problem, since in PMS, no single ersatz world
has to represent reality as a whole correctly. This is simply not the
theoretical role it has to play. Rather, the fact that some worlds in the
intended model represent p as true and some as false, gives us a correct
representation of the way in which our universe is indeterminate, since the
plurality of all worlds in the model gives us the correct truth values for all
propositions which capture determinate aspects of reality (all ersatz worlds
agree on them) and a truth value glut of both true and false regarding p (the
ersatz worlds disagree in the truth value they assign), the proposition which
is about the indeterminate aspect of reality. From an intuitive perspective,
the core idea of the glutty version of PMS is hence that, just as the
indecision of a group as a whole is sometimes best understood in terms of
definite individual opinions which agree on most, but diverge on certain
items, cases of metaphysical indeterminacy are sometimes best understood
in terms of a coincidence of several ersatz worlds which agree on the truth
or falsity of most, but disagree on the truth or falsity of some propositions,
namely those which are about the indeterminate aspects of reality.
A diverse class of potential examples of MI have been given in the
literature. Some for example claim that the openness of the future should be
understood in terms of MI (e.g. Barnes & Cameron 2008) others link MI to
material objects with fuzzy boundaries, (e.g. Tye 1990) and there are of
course those who argue that quantum mechanics give rise to MI (see e.g.
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Darby 2010, Skow 2010, Calosi & Wilson 2019). It is not clear whether
these examples all involve the same sort of MI. We believe that Plural
Metaphysical Supervaluationism (PMS) is flexible enough to accommodate
these different sorts of MI, as long as they can in principle be treated by
supervaliationist means.
A core question about any version of supervaluationism is how it handles
the notion of truth. The standard approach in semantic supervaluationism is
to identify truth with super-truth, (see Keefe 2000, §8) i.e. truth in all
admissible precisifications, but the framework of PMS offers the resources
to define different notions of truth. In the application of the theory to cases
of QI, we will rely on the notion of super-truth to give us a notion which
tracks what the quantum state tells us about the states of the world. In such
cases, there will as a consequence be certain propositions which fail to
express super-truths. Accordingly, we will, in one sense, not have a
classical, bivalent object language. We can however make use of the
flexibility of the framework to define classical notions of logical truth and
consequence. This bi-furcated approach to truth will be introduced and
motivated in the following subsections.
Our treatment of logical truth differs importantly from that proposed in
Barnes & Williams 2011. B&W define logical truth and consequence in
terms of truth in a model and truth in a model in terms of truth in the
designated world of a model (cf. p. 133 for the definition in the final third
version of their theory). This definition fits the core idea of their theory,
namely that metaphysical indeterminacy is indefiniteness in which one of a
range of candidate ersatz worlds is actualized. Since PMS allows cases in
which no single world in a model is on its own a candidate for being the one
actualized world, a definition of logical truth relying on designated worlds
would not be the best fit. The definition of logical truth we adopt in the next
subsection does not rely on designated worlds and is hence a better match
for PMS.
4.2 Semantics and Logic
4.2.1 Model Theory and Semantics
In the previous subsection, we have presented the main idea of plural
metaphysical supervaluationism by focusing on the relation Rpp, the relation
which holds between reality and the plurality of ersatz worlds used to model
QI in our theory. While this relation is an important component of PMS, it
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does not belong to the supervaluationist semantics proper which provides
the formal component of the core of the theory. With respect to the latter,
our approach is to stay as conservative as possible to semantic
supervaluationism. What then is the connection between Rpp and the
semantics? To answer the question let us introduce the version of
supervaluationist semantics we work with.
The semantics is a semantics for the language of propositional logic with
the standard set of logical connectives enriched with the D-operator which
syntactically acts just like negation, forming a formula when prefixed to a
formula and which allows us to express claims about determinacy and
indeterminacy. We will use negation and conjunction as the basic logical
connectives. Well-formedness of logically complex formulas is defined in
the standard way. We are focusing on a propositional language instead of a
first-order language (unlike Barnes & Williams 2011) in presenting the
semantics and logic since this somewhat simplifies the presentation and this
fully suffices to spell out the two crucial differences between our theory and
standard semantic supervaluationism. Just like in B&W’s semantic, the
D-operator expresses a primitive concept of definiteness and can be used to
syntactically define the notion of indeterminacy (“It is indeterminate
whether…”) in the standard way: Where φ is a formula of our formal
language, that it is indeterminate whether φ is expressed by the formula
¬Dφ∧¬D¬φ (“It is not definite that φ and not definite that not-φ”).1516
The semantics is a standard possible-worlds semantics for the language
of propositional logic enhanced with the D-operator. A model M is an
ordered triple <WM,RM,⟦·⟧M>, where WM is a non-empty set of (ersatz)
possible worlds, RM a binary accessibility relation which relates pairs of
worlds taken from WM, and ⟦·⟧M a valuation function which assigns one of
the two truth-values TRUE and FALSE to each formula relative to each
possible world in WM.17
17 Note that this means that our semantics corresponds to a restricted variant of
Fine’s supertruth-based semantics developed in Fine (1975) which is limited to
complete models and in which models correspond to possible worlds. It closely
follows the semantics for semantic supervaluationism due to Asher et al (2009).
16 Note that this definition does not amount to a reductive analysis of
indeterminacy; like B&W’s theory, our theory is non-reductive, as indicated in
section 3.1.
15 We rely on the context to distinguish between use and mention throughout this
section and the whole paper.
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The core idea of the semantics is to treat the D-operator as a
necessity-operator. Semantically, this means that it is interpreted in terms of
universal quantification over accessible worlds. With p an arbitrary
propositional constant, φ,ψ formulas of our formal language, and using
M,w⊩φ to express that formula φ is true in world w in model M, we can then
recursively define truth in a world in a model as follows:
● M,w⊩p iff ⟦p⟧M,w = TRUE.
● M,w⊩~φ iff M,w⊮φ
● M,w⊩φ∧ψ iff M,w⊩φ and M,w⊩ψ
● M,w⊩Dφ iff for all w’ such that wRMw’, M,w’⊩φ
The other logical connectives are defined in terms of negation and
conjunction in the usual way.
So far, the semantics is not just conservative with respect to (a possible
worlds-based version of) supervaluationist semantics, it is in fact identical to
it. What distinguishes our semantics from that of semantic
supervaluationism are two features which are not visible in the core
semantics provided by the definition of truth in a world in a model.
The first distinctive feature of our theory is that the relation Rpp (which is
not to be confused with the model-relative accessibility relation RM at work
in the semantics proper!) puts a constraint on the models our theory operates
on. Which constraint is that? We have previously introduced this relation as
a relation which holds between the actual universe and a plurality of ersatz
worlds, where the former is the concrete entity containing us and everything
else with which we are in direct or indirect causal contact and the latter are
abstract objects used in philosophical theories. So construed, Rpp always has
the same entity, the actual universe, as its first relatum, but may relate it to
distinct sets of ersatz worlds, allowing us to model MI in the actual world.
In practice however, we want the relation to do the same for non-actual
states of the universe, or more generally for non-actual possible worlds,
since e.g. we may want to reason about counterfactual cases of MI, or since
we simply do not know enough about the state of our universe to select a
unique set of ersatz worlds to capture its indeterminacy.
Generalizing to non-actual universes, Rpp relates an actual or possible
universe to a plurality of ersatz worlds which, assuming the second
interpretation of the relation proposed in the previous section, together give
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us a precise picture of that universe and including both its determinate, and
indeterminate aspects. For any model M, Rpp thereby determines whether
that model accurately represents the state of any universe, including its
determinate (and in the relevant cases) also its indeterminate aspects by
relating that universe to the plurality of worlds which form the set WM of
ersatz worlds of M. Admissibility in PMS is hence a relative matter: models
are admissible relative to the actual or a possible universe, not admissible
tout court.
Let us briefly pause to comment on the relation between Rpp and RM. We
have earlier introduced Rpp as the plural precifification relation, but we can
now see that this description, while still capturing the general role the
relation plays in our theory, is somewhat misleading. In supervaluationist
semantics, the label “precisification relation” is usually applied to the
accessibility-relation which holds between worlds in a model. In our model
theory, this accessibility-relation is RM and not Rpp. It is hence more apt to
call Rpp the admissibility relation, since it determines which models are
admissible as models of the (indeterminate) state of reality or of a merely
possible universe. Rpp does this by picking out a plurality of ersatz worlds
(the elements of WM) which then in turn stand in the relation RM in any
admissible model M.
One might wonder about the metaphysical status of the possible
universes which Rpp relates to pluralities of ersatz worlds. Are they concrete
universes in the sense of Lewis’s modal realism, ersatz worlds, like those at
work in the formal part of our theory, or something else? Given our reliance
on ersatz worlds, the modal realist option is unattractive for reasons of
parsimony. The disadvantage of relying on ersatz worlds is that it entails
that Rpp no longer neatly bridges the gap between the, metaphysically
speaking, actual world and the possibly actualized ersatz worlds which
together model its indeterminacy in PMS. One further proposal which
allows us to sidestep thorny metaphysical issues regarding the nature of
possible worlds is to take a page out of the two-dimensionalist’s book and18
to assume that instead of the counterfactually possible ersatz worlds at work
in our models, Rpp takes an counteractually possible world as its first
relatum, where the distinction between counterfactual and -actual is not
metaphysically substantive, but rather a matter of perspective or theoretical
role. We will not take a definitive stand regarding this issue here. In order to
18 Cf. for example Chalmers 2006, especially §3.
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develop the formal part of our theory, the only thing which we need to
assume is that we are not limited to our actual universe as the only first
relatum of Rpp.
The second distinctive feature of our logic and semantics is that due to its
function as a WM-determiner, Rpp (in its generalized form) can naturally be
taken to put a constraint on the interpretation of the accessibility relation RM
of any possibly admissible model M and consequently on the logic of the
D-operator with respect to this class of models. We will come back to this
point in §4.2.3, but let us now focus on the definitions of logical truth and
consequence.
4.2.2 Logical Truth and Consequence
Our semantics is designed to admit cases of indeterminacy, i.e. cases in
which a formula is neither definitely true, nor definitely not true. According
to the standard version of semantic supervaluationism, truth simpliciter, i.e.
the notion of truth which connects the theoretical notion of truth in a world
in a model back to the ordinary notion of truth, is identified with supertruth.
(Keefe 2000, §8). In our models, this identification would give rise to
truth-value gaps, assuming that supertruth in a model is defined as truth in
all worlds of the model, since a formula which is neither definitely true, nor
definitely false with respect to one world in the model will be neither
supertrue, nor superfalse. Does this mean that our theory gives us a
non-classical logic? The definition of logical consequence and truth
presented in this subsection allows us to stay classical, meeting a
desideratum expressed both in Barnes & Williams (2011) and Calosi &
Wilson (2019), which could be contested, but which we accept for the sake
of the argument.
One of the main objections to semantic supervaluationism is that as soon
as a definitely-operator is introduced into the object language of the theory,
it stops being fully classical. More specifically, Williamson has argued that
the theory invalidates some inference patterns which are valid in classical
logic, including in particular contraposition, proof by cases, and indirect
proof (see Williamson 1994, §5.3). The failure of these patterns can be
traced to the fact that standard supervaluationism, which relies on supertruth
to define the notion of logical consequence, invalidates the deduction
theorem.19
19 I.e. where φ,ψ are formulas, Δ is a set of formulas, and ⊨S is the supertruth-based
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There are different ways around this problem for supervaluationism
(including both its semantical and metaphysical variants) which we can rely
on to avoid deviations from classical logic in the context of PMS. In §3.1
we have already pointed out that B&W rely on a definition of logical
consequence based on the designated actualized worlds of models. Since our
models do not contain a designated actualized world, we have to take a
different approach. We adopt the one proposed by Asher et al (2009) which
is based on two assumptions. The first is that supervaluationism provides us
with the means to define different notions (or modes) of truth which may
serve different theoretical purposes (Asher et al, 2009, p. 916). This in
particular allows us to distinguish the notion of truth used in the definition
of logical truth and consequence from the notion of supertruth in a model,
which we rely on in order to account for QI.
The second idea is that the mentioned deviations from classical logic can
be avoided by relying on a particular notion of logical consequence. As
Williamson points out in his critique of supervaluationism and as Asher et al
(2009) elaborate, supervaluationists who want to stay classical logic-wise
can replace the global notion of logical consequence they standardly rely on
with a local notion. Let φ and Γ respectively denote a formula and a set of
formulas of our formal language. We can then define a local notion of
supervaluationist consequence symbolized by ⊨ as follows (Asher et al,
2009, p. 919):
● Γ⊨φ iff for every model M and every world w in WM,
if M,w⊩Γ, then M,w⊩φ.
Logical truth is defined in terms of logical consequence from the empty set
of formulas in the standard way:
● ⊨φ iff ∅⊨φ.
notion of logical consequence, it is not generally the case that if Δ∪{φ}⊨Sψ, then
Δ⊨Sφ→ψ. See Fine 1975, p. 290 and Asher et al 2009, p.909. Counterexample: let
Δ be empty and substitute p for φ and Dp for ψ. With ⊨S expressing conservation of
supertruth, i.e. conservation of truth in all worlds in all supervaluationist models,
we have that if ⊨Sp, then ⊨SDp, but not that ⊨Sp→Dp, since there are models
containing worlds in which p is true, but not Dp.
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Since each world gives us a classical valuation of our language, the
definitions ensure that the notions of logical consequence and truth coincide
with their classical counterparts for all formulas which do not contain the
D-operator. The deviations from classical logic involving the operator are
also avoided: they result, as mentioned earlier, from the failure of the
deduction theorem in standard supervaluationist logic, but the deduction
theorem holds for ⊨. The cost of conserving classical logic in this manner20
is that the inferential logic for the D-operator fails to validate the rule of
introduction for the D-operator (D-intro), the rule which allows us to infer
from Δ⊨φ to Δ⊨Dφ, where Δ is a set of formulas.21
Note that the quantifier in the definition of logical consequence is
unrestricted, notably ranging over all logically possible models and in
particular over models which are inadmissible in the context of an
application of PMS to a case of QI, or a case of MI more generally. This
should not come as a surprise, since whether a model is admissible as a
model for a particular case of MI should not have an impact on the meaning
of the notions of logical truth and consequence. To put it differently, logic
makes no difference between models which serve that particular
philosophical purpose and those which do not. The permissive approach
regarding the diverse notions of truth definable in supervaluationism
naturally allows us to disentangle the notion of logical truth and that of
determinate truth in a model which is admissible in a case of MI or QI in the
manner just suggested.
4.2.3 The logic of the D-operator
Let us come back to the second distinctive feature of the formal part of our
theory, the Rpp-based interpretation of the accessibility relation RM and of the
logic of the D-operator for the subclass of all possibly admissible models.
Rpp selects the worlds contained in the set WM of any such model M. Rpp’s
role as the plural precisification relation strongly suggests an intuitive
interpretation of the accessibility-relation RM within each such model M,
21 See Asher et al (2009), p. 922-3. This feature of the logic is incidentally very
much in line with the way cases of QI are handled in PMS, since in these cases, the
determinate truths are imposed on the intended model by the physics. See §5.3.
20 I.e. we have that if Δ∪{φ}⊨ψ, then Δ⊨φ→ψ. The counterexample described in
note 16 does not arise, since p⊨Dp requires the conditional p→Dp to be true in all
worlds in all models, which just means that ⊨p→Dp.
22
which is directly relevant to its formal properties and hence also to the
partial logic of the D-operator with respect to the set of all possibly
admissible models. The worlds in WM are the worlds which together,
assuming again the second proposed interpretation of Rpp, give us a precise
picture of the possible world modelled by M, including its indeterminate
aspects. Accordingly, RM can naturally be taken to be the relation of
co-precisification, the relation which holds between two worlds w and w’
just in case w contributes to precisifying an actual or merely possible
universe together with w’ in M.
Note that this interpretation of RM as the relation of co-precisification
takes into account both non-reducible and reducible cases of plural
precisification. The difference between the two sorts of cases is that in the
former, w’ has to substantially contribute to precisifying our universe,
whereas in the latter, the contribution of w’ might be insubstantial, since w
alone (as well as w’ alone) might already qualify as a precisification.
What is the result of interpreting the accessibility relations in possibly
admissible models as relations of co-precisification among plural
precisificational possibilities? First of all, this interpretation renders the
logic of the D-operator’s a normal modal logic, as suggested by Asher et al
(2009). This means that it contains the axioms of propositional logic and
that we have the rules modus ponens, uniform substitution, and the rule of
necessitation:
● Rule of necessitation: If ⊢φ then ⊢Dφ
Furthermore, we have the K-axiom:
● K-axiom: D(φ→ψ)→(Dφ→Dψ)
The rule of necessitation and the K-axiom for D place rather minimal
constraints on the logical behaviour of the operator which are completely in
line with interpretation in terms of the notion of co-precisification it is given
in PMS. It is furthermore easy to justify the inclusion of the T-axiom, which
holds in all models in which RM is reflexive:
● T-axiom: Dφ→φ
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Given our interpretation, RM is reflexive since any world selected by Rpp
contributes (substantially or insubstantially) to precisifying the actual
universe in a possibly admissible model M together with itself. The resulting
logic KT is the weakest plausible logic for the D-operator. As we have just
seen, the interpretation of the accessibility-relation as the relation of
co-precisification guarantees that the partial logic over the set of possibly
admissible models is a logic of this kind.
The logic of the D-operator should minimally be as strong as KT, but is
it stronger? Like the third and final formal system presented in Barnes &
Williams (2011), our interpretation of RM entails that it is S5: The relation of
co-precisification is an equivalence relation, i.e. in addition to being
reflexive, it is also both symmetric (if w is a co-precisification of w’, then w’
is a co-precisification of w) and transitive (if w is a co-precisification of w’
and w’ is a co-precisification of w’’, then w is a co-precisification of w’’),
which means that the partial logic of D contains the B- and 4-axioms
respectively, giving us S5:
● B-axiom φ→D~D~φ
● 4-axiom Dφ→DDφ
Note that the same arguably holds for the weaker first interpretation of Rpp,
since the relation of
failing-to-determinately-misrepresent-reality-together-with is plausibly also
an equivalence relation.
To summarize, PMS can incorporate a supervaluationist logic for a22
formal language containing the D-operator which is classical and gives us
the analogue to a normal modal logic as strong as S5 with respect to the
class of all possibly admissible models. This all but guarantees that the same
holds for the full logic, i.e. the logic as defined in §4.2.2 with respect to both
possibly admissible and necessarily inadmissible models: no possibly
admissible PMS model is a countermodel to S5, so the complete logic could
only turn out to be weaker for general reasons wholly independent of PMS.
22 But need not. As we have mentioned in § 4.2.2, the semantics we present here
meets the classicality desideratum formulated by Barnes and Williams and Calosi
and Wilson. If one rejects this desideratum, one can instead develop a version of
PMS which incorporates a non-classical logic and semantics.
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A particular feature of the version of PMS developed in this section is
that its notion of logical truth is not defined in terms of supertruth, i.e. truth
in all worlds in a model. Yet, the latter nation still has an important role to
play in our theory, as we will see in the next section.
5        Modeling Quantum Indeterminacy with PMS
In this section our aim is to show how PMS is to be applied to a concrete
case, namely quantum indeterminacy (QI). In §5.1 we introduce three
objections raised against standard MS that are based on quantum
mechanical phenomena. In §5.2 we discuss the proposals recently made by
Torza (2019) and Darby & Pickup (2019) to escape one of these objections,
and suggest why one might find them unsatisfactory. In §5.3 we show how
PMS addresses the objections.
5.1 The QM Objections to MS
Skow (2010) and Darby (2010) independently argued that MS cannot
account for indeterminacy in QM. To see why, let us start by asking how
MS would apply to QI. A natural thought is to interpret each ‘side’ of a
superposition state as a precisificational possibility. Suppose we perform a
spin measurement on a quantum system S in the direction z, and find the
system in an eigenstate of spinUP:
S = |↑ z>
Different spin components in QM are incompatible observables, which
means that if a system S is in eigenstate of spin along a given axis (z, in our
example), then S is in a superposition of the directions mutually orthogonal
with z (namely, x and y):
S = |↑ z > = 1/√2 |↓ x > + 1/√2 |↑ x >
S = |↑ z > = 1/√2 |↓ y > + 1/√2 |↑ y >
According to MS, the following are true in a model representing the above
states:
1. D( Sz-spin = ↑ )
2. D¬( Sz-spin = ↓ )
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3. ¬D( Sx-spin = ↑ ) & ¬D¬( Sx-spin = ↑ )
4. ¬D( Sx-spin = ↓ ) & ¬D¬( Sx-spin = ↓ )
5. ¬D( Sy-spin = ↑ ) & ¬D¬( Sy-spin = ↑ )
6. ¬D( Sy-spin = ↓ ) & ¬D¬( Sy-spin = ↓ )
In words, S is definitely spinUP and definitely not spinDOWN along z, and it is
indeterminate whether S is spinUP along x, spinDOWN along x, spinUP along y,
and spinDOWN along y. (3)-(6) are spelled out in terms of the (standard MS)
D-operator in the usual way (cf. §4.2.1). Semantically, (1)-(2) tell us that,
according to every ersatz world in the MS model representing the state of S,
S has spinUP in z. (3)-(6) express that this is not the case for the spin states
along x and y. There is no uniform value (up or down) which these
observables have across all the ersatz worlds in the model. So far, so good.
A serious problem arises once we look more closely at each ersatz world
in the model and think about whether it is indeed a precisification in the
sense of standard MS, i.e. an ersatz world which does not determinately
misrepresent the system. To answer this question, we have to ask which
values x-spin and y-spin S have in the ersatz worlds of the model. Given that
the state of the system demands that each precisification has to agree on the
value of z-spin (otherwise, they would definitely misrepresent reality), the
following conjunctions represent the only four ersatz worlds in the model
which qualify as candidates for being admissible precisifications (leaving
out the negations of the opposite spin states for the sake of simplicity):
w1: ( Sz-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sy-spin = ↓ ) & ( Sx-spin = ↓ )
w2: ( Sz-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sy-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sx-spin = ↓ )
w3: ( Sz-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sy-spin = ↓ ) & ( Sx-spin = ↑ )
w4: ( Sz-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sy-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sx-spin = ↑ )
The reason why every (w1)-(w4) has to specify a value for each spin
property is because, recall, according to MS ersatz worlds, that is
presifications, are maximally complete sets of propositions. Thus, they
cannot leave matters unsettled. This is however a highly problematic
assumption when it comes to QM. In effect, if we were to write down the
states of the system S for each of (w1)-(w4), we would end up having states
that are nomologically impossible, since they are ruled out by QM. If we
consider w1, for instance, the state of S would be something like:
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S = |↑ z > + S = |↓ y > + S = |↓ x >
This state however makes no sense in QM, because assignments of spin
values in three mutually orthogonal directions have to satisfy the following
constraint in order to be consistently represented in the Hilbert space: nSx +
nSy + nSz = 2. In other words, one of the three directions has to be assigned
value 0, which basically entails that either of the three conjuncts in w1
cannot be true.
Observables (like spin) in QM are represented by operators in a
multidimensional vector space. When an operator gets value 1 (so: the
vector with which it is associated is an eigenvector), its corresponding
subspace has value 1. Crucially however, different operators (corresponding
to different observables, such as different spin components) may share the
same subspace (and so the same value associated with it). This is roughly
why assignments of values must satisfy the constraints inherited from the
vectorial space, and in the case of mutually orthogonal spin components
they cannot always be assigned a value.
Darby and Skow exploit this mathematical feature of the Hilbert space
formalism to show that the core tenet of MS according to which
precisifications are precise is in tension with quantum mechanics. We
register that they also go a step further when they claim that the
Kochen-Specker theorem (KS, 1967) is essential to get to this result.
However, it is not clear why this should be the case, so let us say a few
words to clarify this. Theorems such as the KS theorem exploit the relations
between specific value assignments in subspaces for Hilbert spaces of
certain dimensions and a specific number of vectors in order to generate23
concrete cases where observables cannot be assigned a value (unless we
assign two incompatible ones, 0 and 1). These theorems are meant to rule
out a certain class of theories (those which posit the so-called hidden
variables) which regard the impossibility of assigning every value as an
epistemic limitation. In this sense, the theorems play quite an important role
23 KS establishes a contradiction for a Hilbert space of 3 dimensions with 117
vectors, and this is why the proof is particularly complicated. A simpler proof is in
Cabello at el (1996), where the Hilbert space is 4d, with 18 vectors. Cabello’s proof
is however weaker, because any contradiction in 3d is also a contradiction in 4d
while the converse is not true.
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in quantum foundations. However, it seems misleading to refer to them in
the context of a debate over whether MS is compatible with quantum
indeterminacy or not. After all, if we were to regard the impossibility to
assign definite values as epistemic, then why bother applying MS in the first
place? If the indeterminacy would just be epistemic, MS would trivially24
not apply anyway.
To recap: (i) in MS precisifications are fully precise sets of propositions;
(ii) in QM it is impossible to always assign precise values to certain
mutually dependent observables; (conclusion) MS cannot account for
quantum indeterminacy. Clearly, it is (i) that defenders of standard MS will
want to reject by revising the account. As we are about to show, this can be
done in various ways. Before that, however, we have to present two further
objections to MS based on quantum mechanics, both raised by Calosi &
Wilson (2019).
Calosi & Wilson argue that the incompatibility between quantum
indeterminacy and MS goes much deeper than what Skow and Darby
realised, and concerns the very fact that the account attempts to understand
indeterminacy as a meta-level phenomenon, as Wilson calls it. They
consider two important features of quantum mechanics, and argue that MS
is utterly unable to account for them. First, they consider the phenomenon of
quantum interference (as in the double-slit experiment), and ask what
explains the presence of the interference patterns according to MS. After all,
we see interference effects as due to superposition. This suggests that a
superposed state has physical effects. The question then is how can we
understand the effects of superposition states if these are understood as the
world being unsettled as to which precisification is actualised? Can it be that
presicifications, which are by definition abstract entities, interact with each
other to form the typical interference pattern? At the very least, such a view
would entail a substantive departure from the spirit of MS.
Secondly, Calosi & Wilson suggests that MS fails to provide a plausible
explanation for quantum statistics. This is indeed quite straightforward. If
we take an equal-weight superposition, say of an electron being 50% up and
24 Some interpretations of QM maintain that this is the case at the price of
considering observables like spin as contextual (i.e. dependent on the measurement
context). Since non-contextuality is an assumption of KS, by dropping we avoid
value indefiniteness. That is why, to be precise, what the theorems establish is the
impossibility of non-contextual hidden-variables theories.
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50% down, perhaps the claim that the world is unsettled between two
options might look intuitive. Consider however a state like the following:
S = 75% |↓ y > + 25% |↑ y >
How is the machinery of MS supposed to account for this case? It seems fair
to say that having just two presicifications, without further ado, simply will
not do.
We can thus distinguish three objections to MS based on quantum
mechanics. The first, identified by Skow and Darby, is what we dub the
Indefinite-Value Objection. The second and third, identified by Calosi &
Wilson, will be called the Interference-Pattern Objection and the Statistics
Objection. In §5.2 we focus on two responses to the Indefinite-Value
Objection to be found in the recent literature. We will then come back to our
own proposal, and to how it responds to each objection, in §5.3.
5.2 Sophisticated Versions of MS
In the recent literature on MI there are two proposals that are somewhat
similar to ours, in the sense that both are in part an attempt to “save” the
spirit of the B&W account from the objection that it cannot model the
quantum case. The focus of these proposals is squarely on the
Indefinite-Value Objection. As we have seen, the core of this objection is
that for systems that show a quantum behavior, it is impossible to be in a
determinate state for each value of their incompatible observable properties.
If metaphysical indeterminacy is indeterminacy with respect to which of
many globally determinate states of the system is the actual one, then it is
determinately false that any of them is. In order to save the meta-level
approach from this glitch, an all but obvious idea is to change the semantic
machinery from one in which evaluation is carried out at a global level, to
one in which the evaluation concerns only local matters. There are two
ways, at least, to implement the idea. One is Darby and Pickup’s
modification of the point of evaluation—from whole possible worlds to
situations —the other is Torza’s modification of the semantic relation of25
representational adequacy involved—from a bivalent one (because based on
complete representations) to one which is non-bivalent (because based on
25 They adopt this notion from situation semantics. See e.g. Barwise & Perry 1983.
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incomplete and yet adequate representations). We argue that both proposals
face problems which do not affect ours.
The main idea of Darby and Pickup’s paper is that unlike possible
worlds, which are global and settle the truth or falsity of every proposition
evaluable at them, situations can be silent with respect to certain matters .26
This feature is exploited to model the radical lack of value determinateness
typical of quantum systems. If for an electron e, for instance, it is
determinate whether its spin is up or down with respect to the x-axis, then
e’s spin status must be indeterminate with respect to the y-axis. Given that a
situation about e’s spin status along the x-axis can be silent with respect to
e’s spin status along the y-axis, and vice versa, we can model in a meta-level
fashion the indeterminacy involving e as a form of unsettledness with
respect to which of four situations (e is up along the x-axis, e is down along
the x-axis, e is up along the y-axis, e is down along the y-axis) is the actual
one. None of the four situations will definitely fail to misrepresent the actual
world, as a situation encompassing both a determinate value for the x-axis
and for the y-axis would.
This strategy to screen off the meta-level approach from the quantum
objection is suspicious for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is hard to see how
a precisification can be partial. The original idea behind supervaluationism
is that an imprecise representation is “molded” into a set of precise ones,
and the imprecision of the representation is thereby “transferred” to the
unsettledness of the semantic relation between those and reality. When
adopting this idea to MI, we exploit the semantic machinery to account for
the behaviour of indeterminacy talk on the assumption that there is
non-representational indeterminacy in reality. But situations are not
supposed to correspond to ways reality is like, unless we consider only the
complete ones (with respect to an underlying bivalent logic), that is unless
we fall back on the possible world-based meta-level account. Ersatz precise
situations are at best partial representations of reality and thus not ways in
which reality could be more precise. Our proposal, by contrast, keeps the
core idea of a precisification as a way reality could be if there were no
indeterminacy intact, without succumbing to the problem of ruling out the
value unsettledness of quantum systems.
Secondly, it is not clear what the metaphysical status of the situations that
do not misrepresent the actual world is. It seems clear from the general idea
26 See Corti (forthcoming) for a critical discussion of Darby & Pickup’s proposal.
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of “saving” the meta-level approach from the quantum objection, that
situations, like words in the proposal of B&W, have an ersatz,
representational nature. But unlike ersatz possible worlds, situations are
typically given by combinations of some but not all of the entities and
properties/relations that we find in the model. Therefore, in order to
understand what a situation could represent, we need to specify the overall
worldview from which we abstract them, that is we need to tell a story about
the nature of the entities that inhabit those situations as inhabitants of a
possible world. A natural option is to take them as an abstraction from the27
actual world. This would be akin to Barwise and Perry’s original idea of
understanding situations as concrete states of affairs. But in the context of
Darby and Pickup’s proposal this is problematic. On the one hand, the
theory is silent with respect to the metaphysical status of the actual world
(after all it is a meta-level and not an object level account), but on the other
hand it requires that the situations that are candidate for actuality are
metaphysically dependent on it. The theory thus does not specify any
theoretical role for the actual world, but (implicitly) posits a dependence
relation between it and situations, whose metaphysical nature is
explanatorily crucial for the project. In contrast, in our theory, the actual
world has an important and clearly defined part to play, since it selects the
ersatz worlds used to model MI in each admissible model.
Maybe this is not a fatal strike to the project, and possibly the approach
can be integrated with an object-level account of the indeterminacy in the
world (although in that case, it would go against the initial aim of saving
B&W’s basic idea). However, our proposal is not susceptible to the same
tension, since it preserves the original idea of indeterminacy with respect to
which precisification correspond to the actual world as a way to model the
semantic behaviour of our talk about metaphysical indeterminacy, it only
changes the relation between the precisification and reality (from a singular
to a plural one).
Torza’s proposal is one that explicitly (i) “rejects the precisificational
view of metaphysical indeterminacy” (2017: abstract), and (ii) aims at
27 Those claims would need some fine honing, given that variant domain versions
of possible world semantics and the possibility of alien properties, but the point we
are making here does not require such a level of refinement. Capturing the
difference between global possible worlds and local situations would still require
the specification of what situations are abstracted from.
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providing a reductive analysis of metaphysical indeterminacy, rather than an
elucidation of the semantic behavior of a primitive notion. Those two claims
seem to be in tension with the idea of a “general theory of metaphysical
indeterminacy in the vicinity of [B&W’s]” (p. 3). What we argue for in what
follows is that insofar as Torza’s theory is seen as a strategy to save the
meta-level approach to metaphysical indeterminacy from the quantum
objection, then it fares worse than ours.
Torza agrees with B&W’s assumption that reality is determinate if and
only if there is a unique and complete ersatz world that represents it.
However, in cases of MI or of QI in particular, he takes the uniqueness
condition to hold, and the completeness condition to fail. Roughly, the
world is indeterminate in virtue of the fact that there can be representations
of it that are neither true nor false. Of course, it is not the mere failure of the
completeness condition per se that can account for the fact that the theory is
providing us with a model of metaphysical indeterminacy (and a reductive
one at it). If we bracket all mentions whatsoever of guinea pigs, we can
construct many ersatz words that are incomplete about the subject matter of
guinea pigs, and can thus be said to neither capture the truth, nor the falsity
of claims that involve guinea pigs. From this hardly any fact about the
indeterminate status of guinea pigs, and indeed any fact about the
metaphysical status of the world at large, can be correctly inferred. That is
why crucial explanatory work in Torza’s account is done by the notion of a
semantically nondefective language.
We agree that once this notion is taken on board, a reductive account of
metaphysical indeterminacy (as “representational incompleteness in a
semantically nondefective language” p. 7) can be given in a way that does
not succumb to the Indefinite-Value Objection. However, the price to be paid
to take this route seems to us too high, especially considering that there is a
more conservative option, ours, which delivers the same riches. Torza
characterizes the notion of non-defectiveness in terms of lack of expressions
that are either semantically indeterminate (such as “bald”) or irreferential
(such as “Vulcan”), but this just moves the issue a level up. What makes an
expression semantically indeterminate (or a singular term irreferential) is the
relation in which it stands to its target—that is the actual world, in the case
at issue. The representational capacities of a language are never defective in
some absolute sense, but always with respect to the intended target of the
representation. Therefore, without an object level account that can beef up
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the notion of non-defectiveness, Torza’s account—insofar as it is seen as an
attempt to reconcile the meta-level approach with quantum mechanics—is
explanatorily less efficacious than ours, which does not rely on the
intelligibility of an object level account of metaphysical indeterminacy.
Unlike PMS, both Darby & Pickup’s and Torza’s variants of MS depart
significantly from the fundamental idea of supervaluationism, that of
capturing indeterminacy by relying on classical and complete
precisifications. A further point is that they focus only on the
Indefinite-Value Objection and do not consider the Interference-Pattern and
the Statistics Objections. Their responses to the challenge from QI is hence
incomplete as it stands. We will discuss the remaining two objections from
the perspective of PMS in the next subsection.
5.3 Plural MS and Quantum Mechanics
Recall from §4 that according to PMS, in cases of QI ersatz worlds count as
precisifications only together and as a whole. Each ersatz world can in such
a case be said to on its own determinately fail to misrepresent reality. In
cases of QI however, a set of ersatz worlds can jointly correctly represent
reality, even though none of them alone can. If we stick with the second
interpretation of Rpp, this gives us a glutty view of indeterminacy, whereas
MS, or a version of PMS incorporating the more conservative first
interpretation of Rpp gives us a gappy view. According to MS, indeterminacy
is unsettledness between precise ersatz worlds that do not determinately
misrepresent reality; according to PMS with the second interpretation of Rpp,
in some cases of indeterminacy—including QI—reality is represented by an
irreducible compresence of many precise ersatz worlds. Metaphorically, for
MS, if there is QI the world does not settle which ersatz world is actualized;
for PMS, if there is QI the world settles that more than one ersatz world is
actualized.
Let us now go back to the example given in §5.1 of an electron being in
state S = |↑ z>, with the corresponding indeterminacy of y-spin and x-spin.
While MS would account for such indeterminacy in terms of the various
precisifications taken separately, PMS rather takes the following set of
ersatz worlds to plurally represent the indeterminacy:
w1: ( Sz-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sy-spin = ↓ ) & ( Sx-spin = ↓ )
w2: ( Sz-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sy-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sx-spin = ↓ )
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w3: ( Sz-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sy-spin = ↓ ) & ( Sx-spin = ↑ )
w4: ( Sz-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sy-spin = ↑ ) & ( Sx-spin = ↑ )
So PMS relies on the same ersatz worlds to model this case of QI as MS. As
we would have expected, these four ersatz worlds do not disagree regarding
(Sz-spin = ↑), since the relevant model reflects the physical fact that there is no
indeterminacy about the system’s z-spin. The ersatz worlds however
disagree as to whether the system is up or down in both x and y, reflecting
the indeterminacy of these properties. The difference to MS lies in the role
played by the four ersatz worlds in the model. MS requires each of w1-w4
on its own to not definitely misrepresent the actual world, in order for each
to qualify as an admissible precisification. Since none of the four worlds
does this for the reasons given in §5.1, the model cannot accurately
represent the indeterminacy of the system with respect to the two
observables Sx-spin and Sy-spin.
The fact that none of the four ersatz worlds alone qualifies as an
admissible precisification of the indeterminate portion of reality we are
intending to capture provides the starting point for the PMS-based
interpretation of the model. None of w1-w4 on its own qualifies as an
admissible precisification in the standard, singular sense. But taken together
they manage to plurally represent the indeterminacy of reality in an accurate
way, since they provide us with the set of worlds of an admissible
PMS-model of reality. With this general explanatory scheme in mind, let us
see how PMS addresses the three objections based on quantum mechanics.
5.3.1 The Indefinite-Value Objection and PMS
Recall that the problem with MS was that the precisifications were
individual fully precise possible worlds. But since QM does not allow us to
assign precise values to each property, it followed that none of the
precisification was a candidate for representing reality, since they all
determinately misrepresents reality. As we saw in §5.2, one way to
circumvent the objection is to claim that precisifications need not be precise
(as in Torza, and Darby & Pickup). PMS takes a different path, and insists
that while ersatz worlds are still fully precise and nomologically classical
(i.e., they do not show quantum behavior), none of them is an admissible
precisification, since only taken collectively they can represent QI. PMS
does not take single classical worlds to be admissible precisification in such
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cases. Rather, being an admissible precisification in PMS is a genuine plural
notion that applies to a plurality of worlds. And notice that it seems
plausible to assume that representational entities are nomologically
classical, because this is more often than not the way we represent things.
One could object to this move by noticing that simply by multiplying
classical representations we do not, in principle, get to understand
non-classical scenarios. Although it is made in the context of standard MS,
the following remark by Calosi and Wilson (2019) makes this objection
even more pressing:
Taking precisifications to be ones in which classical laws are operative violates
supervaluationist constraints on admissible precisifications—namely, that
precisifications cannot be determinately incompatible with (cannot
determinately misrepresent) the actual world. In particular, the true claim that
‘the position and momentum of a system cannot be jointly fully precise’ is
determinately true if the actual world is, as we are assuming, a quantum world;
but classical worlds in which every system has determinate position and
momentum will be worlds in which this claim is false, not true; hence any such
world would fail to be an admissible precisification. (p. 18)
The idea is that in order to represent a quantum world, an ersatz world has
to contain quantum laws as propositions. But if it does, it cannot also
contain propositions that are in contradiction with those laws. For example,
an ersatz world w cannot contain the proposition that x-spin, y-spin, and
z-spin cannot be jointly fully precise (which follows from the laws), and the
proposition that x-spin, y-spin, and z-spin are assigned jointly a precise
value, on pain of contradiction. If the latter proposition is dropped, the
ersatz world is not after all fully precise, and thus it fails to possibly be an
adequate representation of the actual world; if the former is, it looks like the
ersatz world is determinately misrepresenting reality, since it is incoherent.
Although we believe this is a fair objection against standard MS with its
singular admissibility-relation, we do not think that it applies to PMS. The
theoretical role allocated to ersatz worlds in PMS is not to individually be a
representation of the actual world that is adequate. Therefore, nothing bad
for our theory follows if we stipulate that they do not contain the laws of
quantum mechanics, and thus each of them, individually, cannot be an
adequate representation of the actual world, when it comes to QI. The very
idea of the theory is that single ersatz worlds are not to be understood as
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adequate representations of reality, but that pluralities of ersatz worlds taken
together are. Hence, the complaint that laws have to show up in any
adequate representation of the world is misplaced with respect to individual
ersatz worlds.28
5.3.2 The Statistics Objection and Interference-Pattern Objection
Recall that according to Calosi and Wilson (2019) MS is not able to account
for the difference between superpositions of different statistical weights
(like 50%/50% and 75%/25%). There are in fact several ways to represent
these weights in PMS. We will briefly mention two.
First, we can recover the statistics through the number of ersatz worlds in
a model by defining an appropriate metric. To do this, we include a suitable
number of ersatz worlds in the set of worlds W of our models, such that
among these worlds, for each state s, the ratio between the number of worlds
according to which s obtains to the total number of worlds gives us the
statistical weight assigned to s. E.g., the total number of ersatz worlds in W
of the model could simply be 2 when the probability distribution we have to
recover is 50%/50% between two distinct states (i.e. we would not have to
inflate the number of worlds compared to a “regular” model which is not
specifically constructed to reflect the probabilities of the relevant states), or
4 ersatz worlds when it is 25%/75% also between two distinct states, and so
on. To implement this response, Rpp would have to be modified accordingly.
A second strategy relies not on the number of worlds in an admissible
model, but rather assigns the statistical weight directly to the ersatz worlds
28 A natural question to ask is where we find the laws in PMS. A way to address
this issue is by accepting a bifurcated treatment of laws of nature, which draws on a
well-established distinction between two kinds of physical laws, namely the
dynamical and kinematical ones. Maudlin (2007) for instance, speaks of
FLOTEs—Fundamental Laws of Temporal Evolution—to refer to the former, and
adjunct principles to refer to the latter. We could suppose that the only laws that
need to be recovered are the kinematical ones, since these are the laws that generate
indeterminacy (namely, those that we cannot have as sentences within the ersatz
worlds). The kinematics could potentially be recovered at the meta-level as a set of
constraints across the possibilities; after all, this is precisely what the kinematics is.
Such a view, though admittedly underdeveloped, does not seem to conflict
irremediably with our understanding of physical laws. Be that as it may, we stress
that this issue is independent from whether or not the ersatz worlds must contain all
the laws as propositions in PMS; as we argued, there is no reason why they should.
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representing the states in the model. One way of implementing this second
strategy is to turn Rpp into a relation which holds between a universe and a
set of tuples each containing first, one ersatz world and, second, a number
suitable to capture the relevant probabilities. This second option would
require a more radical modification of the model theory of PMS.
It has to be noticed that broadly similar strategies are adopted
independently of considerations about QI in the context of the Many-World
interpretation of QM. The Many-Minds interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics is a case in point. However, we should point out that in case of29
PMS, increasing the number of ersatz worlds or modifying the models in the
suggested way is arguably less costly, since the entities that are multiplied
are still only abstract entities posited in the context of a theory of
metaphysical indeterminacy, i.e. not the sort of entities which add to one’s
fundamental ontology.
Finally, turning to the Interference-Pattern Objection, recall that the
problem is how we can explain interference effects, like for example in the
double slit experiment. Ersatz worlds cannot interact with each other, so
how does the interference pattern emerge? While we have to admit that
interference effects cannot be fully explained by PMS, we shall also notice
that other accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy have the same problem
here, including of course other theories which rely on ersatz worlds, as well
as Lewisian “real” worlds—should a theory relying on them ever be
proposed. Notably, even Calosi & Wilson’s (2019) approach faces the same
difficulty, although they are the ones who proposed the objection in the first
place. Their view can either be implemented in gappy terms (no determinate
of the relevant determinable is instantiated), or in glutty terms (more than
one is instantiated). Of course, as they too recognize explicitly, a gappy
implementation would suffer from the very same problem; if there are no
determinate properties (e.g. ‘passing through slit-1’, and ‘passing through
slit-2’), how can the system generate the fringes of interference? For this
reason, Calosi and Wilson (2019) suggest that a glutty approach is to be
preferred. However, the glutty version of their approach is still
underdeveloped. They suggest that each of the determinates forming the glut
is instantiated to a non-zero degree, providing “an occurrent physical basis
for the interference effect” (Calosi & Wilson 2019, p. 24). But as of now
there is no cogent explanation of how properties can be instantiated in
29 See e.g. Albert & Loewer 1988. Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer here.
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degrees, and even if there were, it would still have to be shown how this
degree-ontology can allow for causal interaction of the kind we see in the
double-slit experiment.
Quantum interference is still among the main mysteries of quantum
mechanics—the main one, according to Feynman (1965)—and arguably it
will remain so independently of which account of quantum indeterminacy
turns out to be the best one.
6 Conclusion
Value indefiniteness in QM arguably prompts us to accept that the world
itself, rather than our representations of it can be indeterminate. Cases of
value indefiniteness have also been identified as the Achilles heel of
supervaluationism, a theory which has otherwise established itself as
perhaps the standard theory of metaphysical indeterminacy. PMS provides
us with a general theory of metaphysical indeterminacy which meets the
crucial challenge posed by Quantum Mechanics.
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